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The U.S. Response to the International
Debt Crisis: The International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983
CYNTHIA C. LICHTENSTEIN*
Since 1982, Third World countries have repeatedly fallen short
in their attempts to maintain payments on their debt obligations
to Western banks. This has triggered a series of reschedulings of
this foreign debt and considerable uncertainty as to the general
health of the global economy. Other scholars have outlined the
causes and dimensions of this international crisis.' This Article will
address the U.S. response to the crisis embodied in the Interna-
tional Lending Supervision Act of 19832 ("Supervision Act" or
"Act").
The congressional and regulatory experience with the enactment
of the Supervision Act illustrates the dilemmas inherent in any
governmental response to the debt crisis. The U.S. banking regula-
tors3 are directed by their authorizing statutes to be primarily con-
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School The author would like to thank John
Nadolny, J.D. 1984, Boston College Law School, for his indefatigable work in gathering the
legislative history, the regulations, and other research materials for this article. The author
would also like to extend special thanks to Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., University of
Virginia School of Law, whose editing of her Sokol Colloquium presentation provided the
collegial "feed-back" so necessary for any academic writing.
1. See, e.g., Hurlock, Debt Restructure Agreements. Perspective of Counsel for Borrowing
Countries, in A Dance Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the
International Debt Problem chap. 5 (W. Eskridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming) [hereinafter cited
as A Dance Along the Precipice]; Kubarych, An Analysis of LDC.Financial Vulnerability, in
A Dance Along the Precipice, supra, chap. 1; Roett, The Foreign Debt Crisis and the Process
of Redemocratization in Latin America, in A Dance Along the Precipice, supra, chap. 9.
2. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153, 1278
(codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3901-3912 (1983)) [hereinafter cited as ILSA).
3. Federal regulation of U.S. commercial banks is carried out chiefly by three separate
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cerned with the financial prudence of bank loans and lending poli-
cies.4 At the same time, there are foreign policy 5 and national
security considerations6 related to the maintenance of a flow of
funds to developing countries. The United States may prefer (be-
cause of the political difficulties of foreign aid) to have this funding
carried out by private intermediaries rather than by official (gov-
ernmental) lending. There are indications that it has been U.S.
policy to encourage bank lending to lesser developed countries
since the 1960's. 7 In light of such a national economic policy, the
bank regulators must attempt to oversee the process of private
bank lending and restructuring of foreign debt in accordance with
this policy as well as in accordance with the interests of the bank
depositors and shareholders.
A further dilemma arises when such lending goes sour. The regu-
lators must persuade the legislature that the public sector should
support the private banks in fulfilling the public function of con-
tinued lending, despite contentions that the government is merely
regulators: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Fed"). See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 241, 264 (1982). All three agencies work together to regulate U.S. commercial bank
lending, and thus the three agencies will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the
,regulators."
4. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 83-89 (1982).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 24-28.
6. Some scholars, such as Dr. Riordan Roett, argue that the precarious economic situation
of the Latin American borrowing countries is a national security issue for the United States.
Those who espouse this view of the implications of the crisis tend to stress the interest of
the United States in ensuring an adequate flow of hard-currency funds to our Latin neigh-
bors in order to avert a contraction in their standard of living which might produce political
instability. See Roett, The Foreign Debt Crisis and the Process of Redemocratization in
Latin America, in A Dance Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of
the International Debt Problem ch. 9 (W. Eskridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming); Roett, Democ-
racy and Debt in South America: A Continent's Dilemma, 62 For. Aff. 695 (1984).
7. In the last decade, the U.S. government, along with other western governments, en-
couraged bank overseas lending on the theory that the private flow of funds would aid U.S.
export and job markets. International Bank Lending: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1983) (statement of C.T. Conover,
Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter cited as International Bank Lending Hearings].
More importantly, however, the banks played the role of "broker" between the OPEC na-
tions and the developing world by recycling oil earnings back to countries with balance of
payments deficits increased by the oil shock of 1973-74. See, e.g,, International Financial
Markets and Related Matters: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) (statement of Rep. Chalmers P. Wylie) [here-
inafter cited as International Financial Markets Hearing 1982]. Of course, unlike a "broker,"
the banks borrowed (by taking "petrodollars" in the form of deposits) in order to relend.
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"bailing out" the banks from deserved consequences of
imprudence.'
This Article will explore the political and regulatory tensions un-
derlying the enactment of the Supervision Act in three steps. Part
I relates the background of the 1970's, when a large portion of the
foreign debt to the commmercial banks was incurred, and presents
reasons why both the regulators and the banks failed to anticipate
the risks to banks' financial soundness inherent in sovereign lend-
ing. Part II examines the legislative compromise generated by the
tension between regulatory inability to control the international
lending and congressional outrage at what was viewed by some as
regulatory weakness. Part III of this Article analyzes the regula-
tions implementing the legislation and assesses their impact, or
lack of impact, on the effective governance of international sover-
eign lending.
I. U.S. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING IN THE 1970's
When the Mexican foreign exchange crisis burst upon the finan-
cial world in August 1982,e the major U.S. commercial bank lend-
ers had loans outstanding to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, totaling
137 percent of their capital.10 If these loans were written off, the
nine banks involved would become insolvent.11 It seems that since
losses in foreign loans had traditionally been quite low, few bank-
ers or regulators in the 1970's fully appreciated the risks involved
in sovereign lending.12 Moreover, neither the banks nor the regula-
8. Representative James Coyne, for example, criticized the "young bankers" for urging
Third World countries "to borrow, and borrow, and borrow, because after all they had valu-
able mineral resources or commodities" and for "rushing one after another to every eco-
nomic backwater trying to lend money at a time when they didn't really understand the
credits they were dealing with." International Financial Markets Hearing 1982, supra note 7,
at 96 (statement of Rep. James Coyne).
9. For an account of the Mexican crisis of August 1982 and the resulting mobilization of
international monetary institutions, see J. Kraft, The Mexican Rescue (1984).
10. International Financial Markets and Related Problems: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 381, 386 (1983) (state-
ment of Richard S. Dale, Brookings Inst.) [hereinafter cited as International Financial Mar-
kets Hearings 1983].
11. Given that the loans to these countries exceeded the banks' capital, if the loan values
on the banks' books were to be written down to actual worth (or the debtor countries were
to repudiate the loans and cause their value to be recognized as zero), the capital of these
banks would be impaired.
12. For example, in 1978, the Comptroller of the Currency wrote to the Chairman of the
American Bankers Association's International Banking Division requesting comment on the
1985]
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tors had expertise in techniques of "country risk analysis." The
market test of potential insolvency used to evaluate private lend-
ing cannot be applied to sovereign loans. In addition, dollar lend-
ing to foreigners, unlike lending to domestically-based entities, is
subject to "transfer risk."'"
Of greatest importance to the risk analysis was the difficult de-
termination of the composition and magnitude of a country's debt.
Private banks did not have the mechanisms to force their sover-
eign debtors to provide accurate financial reports of their borrow-
ing activities, and often the countries themselves did not have a
precise accounting of all debts incurred by their agencies. 14 The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) assisted member countries in
generating adequate governmental statistics, but could not share
with private lenders any information gathered in reports from, or
consultations with, member countries without the sovereign's per-
mission. 15 The private banks responded to this problem, not by
limiting lending, but by meeting first in the Ditchley Group, 16 and
legal lending limit concept as it applied to international lending. The American Bankers
Association (ABA) replied that it saw a strong need for an increase in the established 10%
legal lending limit as applied to foreign governments and their related entities. Specifically,
the ABA noted that "[t]he inherent ability to raise revenue through the capacity to borrow,
to tax, and to command the allocation of natural resources distinguishes governmental bor-
rowers from private sector borrowers .... Additionally the repayment and debt servicing
record of foreign governments has been stronger than that of private borrowers." Letter
from Gerald M. Lowrie, Executive Director, Government Relations, American Bankers As-
sociation, to John E. Shockey, Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(March 13, 1978) (comment letter on proposed rules for determining lending limits to for-
eign borrowers) (copy on file at the Offices of the Virginia Journal of International Law).
13. "Transfer risk" is defined as the possibility that a country or the central bank that
holds its hard-currency reserves may not be able to come up with the dollars needed to
service the country's debt,.
14. See Hurlock, Debt Restructure Agreements: Perspective of Counsel for Borrowing
Countries, in A Dance Along the Precipice: The Political and Economic Dimensions of the
International Debt Problem chap. 5 (W. Eskridge ed. 1985) (forthcoming) (noting that lesser
developed countries lack a centralized system for the collection of debt information and
further, that the records that are maintained may be inaccurate).
15. IMF Survey, Oct. 10, 1977, at 321.
16. In May 1982, the Ditchley Group first congregated at Ditchley Park, England, at a
meeting organized by the Committee on Changing International Relations, a subgroup of
the National Planning Association. Participants included major commercial bankers from
countries involved in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development; Jacques
de Larosi~re, Managing Director of the IMF; representatives from the World Bank; and
C.T. Conover, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency. The intention of the participants was
"to discuss the general international financial picture for the early and mid-1980's." Instead,
the discussion turned to the drastic repayment problems of specific debtor nations, and to
"the proper role of the banks in responding to this global financial crisis." Surrey & Nash,
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then by setting up the Institute for International Finance17 to
gather and exchange debtor country information. Unfortunately,
this interbank cooperation came only after the banks had collec-
tively committed so much capital to a small group of middle-in-
come developing countries, including Mexico, Brazil and Argen-
tina, that a sudden refusal to roll over these loans might have
brought down the international financial system.18
The bank regulators recognized the problem brought about by
the banks' over-exposure in the developing countries." Under the
structure of federal banking regulations, however, the regulators
are not empowered by the legislature to force the banks to diver-
sify or to otherwise dictate allocation of assets.20 The only federal
regulatory diversification requirement (applicable only to national
banks, albeit a category that includes most of the major money
center banks) is the single borrower rule. This rule limits the cov-
ered extension of credit to a single borrower to fifteen percent of
the bank's capital and surplus.21 Thus the Office of the Comptrol-
ler and its bank examiners could take action with respect to the
banks' over-exposure only if the loans were in violation of the sin-
gle borrower rule. The statute that established the single borrower
rule, however, was not drafted in terms of sovereign lending. The
Bankers Look Beyond the Debt Crisis: The Institute of International Finance, Inc., 23
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 111, 111-12 (1984).
17. The Institute for International Finance, Inc. "is an organization of private commercial
banks from both developed and developing countries which seeks to improve the process
whereby banks make international lending decisions, and, more broadly, to improve the pro-
cess of international lending itself." Id. at 111. The organization was "conceived" in May
1982 and established in January 1983. Id. For a general discussion of the Institute and its
functions, see id.
18. By June 1982, U.S. bank loans to developing nations totaled $9&6 billion, $52.4 bil-
lion of which comprised the loans to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. International Financial
Markets Hearings 1983, supra note 10, at 71 (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Table UI)).
19. See Srodes, Governor Wallich Wants the IMF to Advise LDC Lenders, Euromoney,
Apr. 1977, at 24, 24-25 (interview with Governor Wallich of the Federal Reserve Board).
20. See Lichtenstein, U.S. Banks and the Eurocurrency Markets. The Regulatory Struc-
ture, 99 Banking L.J. 484, 510-11 (1982).
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982). This section was completely revised in 1982. Prior to its
amendment, the lending limit was 10% of a bank's capital rather than the current 157
limit. For the current implementing regulations, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.1-32.7 (1984). See gen-
erally, Lichtenstein, supra note 20, at 510-11.
22. The original statute did not include a definition of "person" as does the amended
statute." 'Person' means an individual; sole proprietorship; partnership; joint venture; asso-
ciation; trust; estate; business trust; corporation; not-for-profit corporation; sovereign gov-
ernment or agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof; or any similar entity or
1985]
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statute-refers to any one "person," and in the early 1970's, the reg-
ulations under the statute did not address how this term should be
applied to extensions of credit to foreign governments, their agen-
cies and their instrumentalities.23
In 1977, the Comptroller attempted to deal with the exposure
problem while staying within the bounds of his statutory authority.
He instructed the bank examiners to determine whether a govern-
mental instrumentality had a source of revenue apart from the sov-
ereign's budget with which to repay extensions of credit and
whether the special purpose of the loan to the governmental in-
strumentality had been documented by the bank extending the
credit.24 As a result of these instructions, Mexico publicly voiced
concern that "its ability to borrow in the United States [was] being
restricted by growing pressure on United States banks to curb
their lending to developing nations carrying heavy debt burdens."2 5
The Mexican Ministry of Finance suggested that a new examina-
tion approach might force "Mexico to turn increasingly to Western
Europe and Japan to meet its enormous borrowing needs.
'26
Nevertheless, the Comptroller persisted in his attempts to inter-
pret his statutory authority in such a way that he could force
banks to consider seriously the total loans outstanding to govern-
ments and their instrumentalities. In January 1978, after meetings
with counsel for the major banks and consultations in Mexico, the
Comptroller proposed a rule incorporating a functional test to de-
termine which state entities should be grouped together as one
"person" for purposes of the single borrower rule. A discussion of
this test is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the Comptroller, in dealing with the problem of
sovereign lending, recognized the U.S. foreign policy need to sup-
port the continued growth of our continental neighbors to the
organization." 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982).
23. The implementing regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1310 and 7.1320 (1977), addressed the
aggregation of loans to partnerships, corporations and their subsidiaries and certain other
enterprises. The regulations, however, did not address the question of which governmen-
tally-owned corporations should be associated with the sovereign itself for the purpose of
assessing whether the legal lending limit had been exceeded.
24. Riding, Mexico Is Worried That New U.S. Rules Are Curbing Loans, N.Y. Times, Oct.
19, 1977, at D1, col. 1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1800, 1801 (1978) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 20) (proposed Jan.
12, 1978).
[Vol. 25:2
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south. The Comptroller could have stopped the lending to Peru,
Mexico or Brazil by defining all government agencies and instru-
mentalities as the same "person" as the central government itself,
thus limiting all covered extensions of credit to a country's public
sector to ten percent of a bank's capital and surplus. Such a regu-
lation, however, would have generated immediate protests from
banks in addition to creating foreign relations problems.28 In short,
the single borrower statute was not then and is not now a good tool
for the supervision of foreign public sector lending by U.S. mul-
tinational banks. The limited definition that the Comptroller
adopted did not restrain the Latin American lending, but it cer-
tainly indicated the authority's concern.29
Whatever the banks' justification for their high level of Latin
American lending prior to 1979, one wonders why the lending in-
creased after the second OPEC price shock in 1979. The congres-
sional hearings on the crisis detailed some of the possible reasons
for the continued lending.30 For example, the allocation of loan
fees to present earnings made continued lending and rescheduling
attractive to bank managers under pressure to generate annual in-
creased earnings."s The main reason for continued lending was that
28. With regard to the foreign affairs ramifications of such a strict regulation, consider
the comment of the Central Bank of Mexico on the much milder 1978 rule proposed by the
Comptroller. It began by emphasizing the Central Bank's understanding of "the need to
have a banking system based on a reasonable diversification of risks as well as on other
practices contributing to its soundness." It went on, however, to complain that the proposed
regulation had already led some bank examiners "to adopt procedures that have been even
more restrictive than those proposed," and to protest that such restrictiveness, if genera-
lized, "could result in a harmful restriction on access of foreign borrowers to U.S. financial
markets." The letter then detailed why foreign governments should not be considered a
single "person" for purposes of the statute:
From our point of view, the proposed regulation fails to grasp fully the particu-
lar characteristics of a "mixed economy" such as ours. It is for us difficult to
understand why the nature of such a system should affect its creditworthiness or
bring about the combination of a particular borrower with the government.
Letter from Gustavo Romero Kolbeck, Director General, Banco de Mexico, S.A., to John G.
Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency (March 3, 1978) (copy on file at the Offices of the
Virginia Journal of International Law).
29. The final regulation was added in 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330 (1979). This section was removed
in 1983, but its language was adopted in 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(d), which is currently in force.
In the period from early 1979 until the Mexican crisis in 1982, the nine major US. com-
mercial bank lenders increased the total of their loans to public and private borrowers in
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil from 114% to 137% of equity. International Financial Mar-
kets Hearings 1983, supra note 10, at 386 (statement of Richard S. Dale, Brookings Inst.).
30. See generally International Bank Lending Hearings, supra note 7; International Fi-
nancial Markets Hearings 1983, supra note 10.
31. International Bank Lending Hearings, supra note 7, at 83 (statement of Richard S.
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the banks were, in a very real sense, hostages of their earlier opti-
mism. Once the large banks had lent substantial sums to sovereign
borrowers or to private borrowers with sovereign guarantees, they
had little choice but to continue lending to those borrowers. Ac-
cording to Richard Dale:
A key feature of the market in international lending is
that, in the presence of sovereign immunity, lenders and
borrowers are bound together not by enforceable contrac-
tual obligations but by crude sanctions [such as repudia-
tion by the debtor and exclusion from financial markets
by the creditors], which, because they are mutually dam-
aging, are seldom invoked. One consequence of this situa-
tion is that lenders have no control (as they do in the
domestic context) over the total indebtedness that coun-
try borrowers may incur.32
Before 1977 and the Comptroller's experiments with the loan
limitation, federal regulatory policy essentially ignored the issue of
diversification in international lending. Although federal bank ex-
aminers were supposed to monitor imprudent loan practices, they
did not have the statutory authority to prohibit large loans that
did not violate the single borrower rule or the concentration of
those loans in several similarly situated developing countries.
Apart from this statutory problem, the failure to criticize loans to
specific countries is understandable, since adverse classifications of
certain countries by government regulators might have had diplo-
matic and political ramifications for the United States abroad.
After the second OPEC price shock in 1979, the federal regula-
tors instituted a new system of guidelines for evaluating country
risk under the direction of an Interagency Country Exposure Re-
view Committee"3 (ICERC). The ICERC was charged with moni-
toring bank exposures, evaluating banks' internal systems for man-
aging country risk, assessing the credit-worthiness of particular
countries, identifying problems that could arise because of transfer
Dale, Brookings Inst.).
32. International Financial Markets Hearings 1983,.supra note 10, at 390.91 (statement of
Richard S. Dale, Brookings Inst.).
33. Id. at 84-89 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Appendix II)). The Interagency Country Exposure Review Com-
mittee (ICERC) was established by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.
See infra text accompanying note 75.
[Vol. 25:2
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risk, and bringing these problems to the attention of bank manage-
ment.3 4 The ICERC, however, failed to prevent the escalation of
risky sovereign debt. This problem resulted because banks could
ignore the committee classifications without fear of sanction from
the ICERC; market sanctions did not exist because the classifica-
tions were not public. The failure of the ICERC approach has led
some commentators to argue that "jawboning" for diversification is
not enough and that stronger, binding legal constraints are
needed."5 Better tools for encouraging bank prudence, however,
lead to a political bind. Improved bank practices must be obtained
without damaging foreign friendly states or imperiling the increas-
ingly precarious debt situation.
In the 1970's, this political dilemma sometimes meant that the
banks were encouraged to take or withhold action for political rea-
sons rather than economic ones. An example of such a situation
came to light in the 1977 Senate hearings and is related here at
length to illustrate both the dilemma of U.S. banking regulators
and the problems inherent in using the private sector to finance
developing countries. The story concerns commercial bank lending
to the Indonesian government-owned oil company, Pertamina. 6
The government of President Suharto was attempting to restruc-
ture and develop the Indonesian economy. In conjunction with the
plan, President Suharto put General Ibnu Sutowo, his advisor and
34. International Financial Markets Hearings 1983, supra note 10, at 84-89 (statement of
Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Appen-
dix 1I)). ICERC employs a system for categorizing borrower nations according to transfer
risk. Countries are subject to ICERC classification only when an interruption in external
payments occurs or appears imminent. Based on ICERC review of a nation's reasons for
non-payment, its prospective sources of financing, and its potential for renewed debt-servic-
ing, ICERC classifies the nation's loan as substandard, doubtful or loss. See id. at 87-88.
Bank regulators recently have proposed a revision of the transfer risk classification system.
See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
In addition to assessing transfer risk, ICERC classifies the debt-servicing potential of bor-
rowing nations as strong, middle or weak. When a bank's exposure to a weak country ex-
ceeds 10% of its total capital or when exposure to a middle country exceeds 15% of total
capital, the federal bank examiners note the condition in their bank examination report.
The purpose of such comment is to alert the bank to the situation; no action by the bank is
required. International Financial Markets Hearings 1983, supra note 10, at 86-87 (statement
of Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Ap-
pendix 11)).
35. See, e.g., id. at 405 (statement of Richard S. Dale, Brookings Inst.).
36. For the details of the Indonesian loan crisis, see Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
Report on S. 2152, Bretton Woods Agreements Amendments Act of 1977, S. Rep. No. 603,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-25 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate Report).
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personal friend, in charge of the oil sector of the economy. The
President appointed a number of technocrats with economic cre-
dentials but no personal power base as the managers of the re-
mainder of the economy. Unfortunately General Ibnu Sutowo
never consulted with the technocrats in his management of the oil
sector, but proceeded with his plan to develop Pertamina by bor-
rowing money. At that time, there were many bankers anxious to
utilize the deposits that they had obtained in the very liquid
Eurocurrency markets of the early 1970's and thus more than will-
ing to provide financing for General Ibnu's undertakings.
In the meantime, Indonesia experienced general economic diffi-
culties, and a stand-by agreement with the IMF to assist with bal-
ance of payments problems was concluded in 1972.37 The stand-by
agreement set a ceiling on external borrowing by Indonesia. 5 Ac-
cording to the then U.S. Economic Counselor in Indonesia, the pri-
vate commercial banks, anxious to continue lending to Pertamina,
did not observe the ceiling. They colluded with General Ibnu in
drafting loan agreements which appeared to conform to the debt
ceiling but in fact evaded it.39 The U.S. Embassy directly en-
couraged the U.S. banks to cooperate fully with the technocrats in
the Indonesian government who wanted to carry out the IMF pro-
gram and maintain the ceiling.40 The State Department appealed
both to U.S. bank representatives in Jakarta and to the banks'
home offices in the United States to restrain private bank lending
to Indonesia.4
By the end of 1974, Pertamina's situation had deteriorated dra-
matically and the oil company became unable to repay its obliga-
tions. At the same time, as the result of a tightening of the
Eurocurrency market following the failure of Herstatt bank, the
37. Id. at 22. When a country seeks balance of payments assistance from the IMF, it
typically enters into an arrangement in which the IMF agrees to lend the country money in
return for the country's commitment to an economic stabilization program. For a good ex-
planation of the process of IMF aid to developing countries and the negotiation of "stand-
by arrangements," see A. Lowenfeld, The International Monetary System § 2.3 (3d ed.
1984).
38. The stand-by agreement stated the total permitted amount of medium-level external
debt (loan maturities of one to fifteen years) that Indonesia would be permitted to incur and
still be in compliance with the economic program for its recovery worked out with Fund
officials. 1977 Senate Report, supra note 36, at 22.
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commercial banks' excess liquidity was disappearing 42 At this
point, the U.S. Embassy changed its position. Rather than urge the
banks to reduce their lending to Pertamina, the Embassy began to
encourage the banks not to declare their unpaid loans in default
and moreover, to elicit assurances from the Indonesian government
that the Indonesian Central Bank would support Pertamina so
that it could repay the private foreign banks.43 In other words, af-
ter having told the banks not to lend, the U.S. Embassy then
found itself asking the banks not to call in the loans because the
United States could be hurt politically.
In the end, the situation was resolved. The banks did not call
the loans but rather worked with Indonesia to muddle through the
crisis. When Congress heard this story in 1977, however, it asked
why the regulators had permitted the banks to make the loans to
Pertamina in such an unrestrained and indeed, uncooperative fash-
ion.44 The Senate Committee was particularly concerned that the
banks had made loans that violated the IMF conditions on exter-
nal borrowing by Indonesia and its instrumentalities. The senators
argued that if the IMF thought borrowing in excess of a certain
level was imprudent for Indonesia, then the lenders could be con-
sidered imprudent for violating the IMF agreement. In their opin-
ion this was the sort of imprudence which the regulators were sup-
posed to control.45 In response to this and other lending activity
involving developing countries, Congress admonished the regula-
tors in 1977 to be more diligent in preventing inadvisable foreign
loans.46 However, Congress did not include any specific directions
for the bank regulators concerning oversight of international lend-
ing by U.S. banks in the Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amend-
ments of 1977.11
H. THE INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION AcT OF 1983
When the question of additional funding for the IMF came up
again in 1983, the Senate focused on the extent to which impru-
dent lending by the private commercial banks had contributed to
42. Id. at 22-23. See also J. Spero, The Failure of Franklin National Bank 110-13 (1930).
43. 1977 Senate Report, supra note 36, at 23.
44. Id. at 24-25.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 25.
47. Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendments of 1977, 22 US.C. §§ 286t, 286e-lf,
286k (1982).
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the economic crises in the developing countries. After the
Pertamina disaster and the Senate's rebuke in 1977, the Senate
wanted to know why the banking regulators had not been more
vigilant in guarding against excessively risky sovereign lending
since that time and how the regulators proposed to deal with the
present situation.48
The regulators responded with a Joint Memorandum on the
"Program for Improved Supervision and Regulation of Interna-
tional Lending," submitted to the Senate Banking Committee by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation.49 They explained that after the concern in 1977
over the role that private lending had played in Indonesia's eco-
nomic crisis and pursuant to Congress' directive in the creation of
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council,"° they had
jointly instituted a system for uniform examination procedures for
evaluating country risk factors in international lending by U.S.
banks. This was the ICERC system previously described. 1 The
Joint Memorandum reflected a sophisticated understanding of the
special transfer risks associated with sovereign lending and ac-
knowledged that the prior procedures had been inadequate.
In the Joint Memorandum, the regulators expressed concern
over the risk to the banks themselves represented by the enormous
amount of developing country external debt. They intended, there-
fore, to integrate the country exposure reports with their reviews of
capital adequacy. Banks that had over-concentrated their loans in
one particular country would be required to add to their capital
base. 52 In addition, the regulators proposed a five-point program to
"help assure earlier recognition of potential international pay-
ments problems, encourage orderly responses to these problems,
48. See Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems: Hearing on S. 502 and S. 695
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1983) (statement by Sen. John Heinz) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing].
49. Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation & Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, Joint Memorandum: Program for Improved Supervi-
sion and Regulation of International Lending (1983) [hereinafter cited as Joint Memoran-
dum], reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 24-52.
50. Federal Financial Institutions Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3308 (1982). The Coun-
cil was created to coordinate the examination procedures for foreign loans used by the dif-
ferent banking agencies.
51. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
52. Joint Memorandum, supra note 49, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 27.
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and provide for stronger reserves to meet adverse conditions when
they infrequently, but inevitably, arise."0 3 The program contained
the following proposals:
1. Strengthening of the existing program of country risk
examination and evaluation;
2. Increased disclosure of banks' country exposures;
3. A system of special reserves [called the "Allocated
Transfer Risk Provision"];
4. Supervisory rules for accounting for fees [collected for
loans]; and
5. Strengthening international cooperation among foreign
banking regulators and through the International Mone-
tary Fund."
The first proposal, dealing with country risk evaluation, was an
extension of the ICERC policies to avoid risk concentration and to
increase diversification. 55 The third proposal, regarding special
reserves, reflects a novel approach to encourage lenders to be more
cautious when making new foreign loans. 6 The fourth proposal
would assure uniformity in bank accounting practices to reduce ar-
tificial incentives for foreign lending.
7
As a package, the regulators' proposals reflect a duality in policy
which was also evident in the U.S. response to the Indonesian situ-
ation in 1977.'s The regulators were concerned with encouraging
the banks to be more prudent in their international lending and in
their exposure to country risk. At the same time, the regulators
were well aware of the risk to the entire international monetary
system if the banks called their loans or failed to agree to a re-
structuring of the debt and the input of new money to permit some
continuing payment on old loans. Although the Joint Memoran-
dum is phrased in typically cautious regulatory language, the con-
cern of the regulators over the need for continued flow of capital to
the developing nations is perfectly clear. According to the regula-
tors, their five-point program
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 27.
56. Id. at 29.
57. Id. at 30.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 4243.
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has been designed to create incentives for prudent lend-
ing but without establishing arbitrary obstacles to inter-
national capital movements or preventing the continua-
tion of credit flows to credit-worthy borrowers.
Depending upon particular circumstances, continued
capital flows to basically credit-worthy countries in cur-
rent strained economic conditions remains [sic] appropri-
ate-especially in the context of IMF-approved economic
stabilization programs-in order to encourage appropri-
ate adjustment by borrowers to their problems, to main-
tain their capacity to service their outstanding debt, and
therefore to preserve the integrity of existing bank
assets.59
In other words, congressionally-imposed harsh measures against
the banks would only cause them to stop any new lending, and this
the system cannot afford.
The dual concerns of the regulators mirror the dual goals of na-
tional monetary control. The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System acts not only as a bank regulator, but is also the
nation's central bank in charge of the money supply. The Federal
Reserve System, together with the Treasury, is responsible for par-
ticipation in international monetary cooperation. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the Joint Memorandum stresses that
"broader considerations of the stability of the international finan-
cial and economic system are at stake as well [as the particular
considerations of the ability of borrowers "to service their out-
standing debt" and "preserve the integrity of existing bank as-
sets."]."60 Both of the novel suggestions in the regulators' five-
point program, the "Allocated Transfer Risk Provision" and the
rules on bank accounting for fees collected in connection with in-
ternational syndicated loans, must be understood as means of us-
ing private bank lending to encourage compliance by debtor coun-
tries with IMF remedial programs and of discouraging special
incentives for international lending except where it is needed.
With respect to the first of the two suggestions, the regulators
proposed a system of "provisioning against certain country expo-
sures." 61 When a borrower has been unable to service its debts over
59. Joint Memorandum, supra note 49, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 26.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 29.
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a protracted period of time, whether or not that borrower is a sov-
ereign, it is appropriate to recognize the risks and diminished qual-
ity of the assets represented by these loans. Generally, "banks are
required to review their credits to determine whether all or parts
of particular loans should be declared 'loss' and charged off or
whether additional provisions should be made to the allowance for
possible loan losses in light of such credits."' 2 The regulators re-
ported, however, that countries' transfer risks were not routinely or
uniformly used to adjust the net carrying value of the affected as-
sets as they should have been. To remedy that problem, the regu-
lators proposed that banks make special allocated provisions
against certain assets found to be severely affected by transfer risk
problems. These special reserves would be called "Allocated Trans-
fer Risk Provisions.
'6 3
As described, these special reserves appear to be a prudent mea-
sure analogous to the loan loss reserves kept by banks against ordi-
nary credit risk on lending. However, the regulators were relatively
honest in their admission that the special reserves were more of a
goad to urge banks towards desirable social behavior than protec-
tion for depositors and investors. As described by the regulators:
Such provisions would be deducted from current earnings
and, to the extent required by regulation, would not be
included in capital for regulatory and accounting pur-
poses. The prospective requirement for reserving, with its
attendant bottom-line earnings impact, should act as a
cautionary element when the initial decision to lend is
being made."
Because of the requirement that any such reserves be deducted
from current income, the proposed transfer risk reserve, as far as
the banks are concerned, would operate somewhat like a tax in re-
ducing the reported earnings of the banks. Since banks report pub-
licly how much they earn, any reduction in reported earnings af-
fects the value of their stock. Thus no bank would want to be
required to keep such a reserve, particularly since the regulators
62. Id. at 40 (Appendix C). In conjunction with this proposal, assets subject to deficien-
cies in debt-servicing would be categorized as "reservable" by the ICERC, rather than "sub-
standard" or "doubtful." Id. at 41 (Appendix C). See supra note 34.
63. Joint Memorandum, supra note 49, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 40-
41 (Appendix C).
64. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
1985]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
were suggesting that the reserve not be counted as part of capital.
The banks would have to take money out of income, put it into a
special fund, and still be subject to the regulatory objection that
the bank capital was inadequate to support its lending. As a result,
the proposed requirement of a special reserve constituted a very
powerful threat by the regulators which could influence bank
conduct.
When the regulators stated in the Joint Memorandum that
"such reserve provisions would not apply to lending to a country
where the terms of any restructuring of debt were being met,
where interest payments were being made and where the borrow-
ing country is complying with the terms of an IMF-approved stabi-
lization program, ' 65 it is perfectly clear that the regulators were
suggesting a system that would motivate private lenders to ensure
country compliance with an IMF stabilization program. This is in
contrast to the Pertamina situation in the 1970's when the banks,
anxious to lend, were in effect abetting Indonesian evasion of the
IMF restrictions.
6 6
The other novel proposal in the Joint Memorandum was the new
accounting rule for loan fees. The regulators had noticed that the
multinational bank lending syndicates for Eurodollar loans were
behaving very much like syndicates of investment banks and were
assessing a number of special fees. In addition to commitment fees
generally charged in connection with loans, one or more of the
banks in these syndicates were also charging front-end fees, agency
fees, advisory fees and expense reimbursements. 6 The special fees
65. Id. at 29-30.
66. See supra text accompanying note 39.
67. "Front-end fees" are flat fees paid by the borrower to the lending banks, often on the
date of the loan signing or disbursement. They resemble an origination fee because they are
expressed as a percentage of the credit facility and are paid to cover the administrativo
expenses of originating a loan. The front-end fees include "management fees," paid to some
of the lending banks in return for "additional service provided or 'underwriting risk' as-
sumed." Joint Memorandum, supra note 49, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at
51.
An "agency fee" is paid by the borrower to the agent bank to reimburse it for expenses
resulting from administrative duties such as telex, printing and travel. The calculation of
this fee is based upon the number of banks participating in the transaction, the complexity
of the loan, and the amount of anticipated communication between the borrower and the
banks. Id. at 52.
"Commitment fees" compensate the lending banks for a legal commitment to lend to the
borrower according to set terms at some future time. This fee has also been called the "res-
ervation fee" and is based upon a percentage of the future commitment. Id.
"Advisory fees" are paid by the borrower as compensation to a bank or banks, for "spo-
[Vol. 25:2
INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION AcT
are of considerable importance to banks to the extent that, as an
accounting matter, the banks report them as income at the mo-
ment the lending arrangements are put together rather than treat-
ing the fees as additional interest which, under accounting rules,
must be accrued over the term of the loan. 8 The regulators were
concerned that some of these fees "provide an added incentive to
seek out international loans in order to boost earnings immediately
and, once this has occurred, to sustain past earnings levels."69 The
regulators proposed that the fees "be treated as interest except
when they are identifiable as reimbursement of direct costs."70 The
accounting proposal was designed so that the regulators could re-
move any artificial incentive for the banks to prefer foreign lending
over ordinary commercial lending.
In recommending the transfer risk reserves, the accounting rules
and the proposals on examination of country risk and disclosure,
however, the regulators also urged the Senate Banking Committee
that they be allowed adequate flexibility in issuing their regula-
tions in order to ensure that the banks continue to roll over the
loans, and not withdraw from the business of international lending.
They thus recommended that the proposed legislation not include
any specific provisions concerning international banking
supervision.71
The Senate Banking Committee agreed that "great care should
be taken not to complicate upcoming debt restructurings or to im-
pede future prudent growth in foreign lending." But the Commit-
tee "also concluded that specific legislative action [was] needed to
mandate permanent improvements in the supervision and regula-
tion of international lending, to improve the timeliness and com-
cific advisory service[s]" provided in connection with a transaction, such as the coordination
of a multi-bank loan. Id. "Expense reimbursements" are paid to banks to cover such costs as
legal and travel expenses incurred in the arranging of credit facilities. Id.
68. Id. at 30.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The regulators argued that their enabling statutes and the Financial Institutions Su-
pervisory Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464, 1724, 1728, 1730, 1730a, 1813, 1817-1821 (1982),
gave them the authority to implement the five-point program.
In view of the existence of this authority it would not be desirable to establish
rigid or inconsistent legislative rules that could limit the ability of the banking
regulators to adapt the program as they gain experience with its implementation
and could have the unwarranted and unintended effect of discouraging the inter-
national lending necessary to support world trade and economic recovery.
Joint Memorandum, supra note 49, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 33.
19851
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
prehensiveness of public information on foreign borrowing and
lending, and to assure that appropriate accounting procedures are
used to report the true results of international lending. '72 Essen-
tially, the Senate was agreeing with the regulators that flexibility
was necessary, but in light of the Pertamina situation and the reg-
ulators' failure since 1979 to restrain lending, the Senate chose to
cut back on regulatory discretion.
The House Banking Committee was prepared to go even further.
As far as the Committee was concerned, the lending banks had
been opportunistic and imprudent, and the regulators had been al-
most criminally lax and complacent.73 The Committee criticized
the regulators' recommendation that they be allowed to formulate
new rules on their own.
In 1977, such a recommendation would have been mean-
ingful. In 1983, after six years of agency assurances, a re-
form proposal consisting of general comments and guide-
lines yet to be specified . . . was insufficient. The long
history of banker excess and regulatory neglect in the
area of international lending made the agencies' proposal
and legislative recommendation unacceptable. 4
As a result, the House bill contained detailed mandatory rules to
be implemented by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, an organization established in 1978 to coordinate the ex-
amination procedures of the various federal agencies and which
later produced the ICERC. 5 The House Banking Committee ex-
pressed an utter lack of faith in the traditional bank regulators to
devise or enforce adequate rules. 6
72. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, to accompany S. 695, Bretton
Woods Agreements Act Amendments and International Lending Supervision, S. Rep, No.
122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate Report].
73. House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, to accompany H.R. 2930, In-
ternational Economic Recovery and Financial Stability Act, H.R. Rep. No. 177, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 26-27 (1983) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
74. Id.
75. See id. at 5-9; 19-27. The Council was created by Title X of the Federal Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, §§ 1001-1009, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3308 (1982).
76. In the Committee's view, the testimony of witnesses, the reports of the GAO,
and other information available to the Committee, indicate that the supervisory
failings which permitted the build-up of U.S. bank foreign debt is [sic] attributa-
ble to failures in supervisory followup by the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller
of the Currency, and the FDIC, and not to the Council itself.
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Arguably, this initial reaction by the House Banking Committee
was extreme. The regulators' recommendation was a sound one
notwithstanding Pertamina and the other shortcomings of the
prior decade. Given the precarious balance between protection
against unwise foreign lending and the preservation of the interna-
tional financial system through the continued flow of new money,
it is necessary to allow the regulators flexibility in making the
rules. The regulators must be able to adjust the rules as the condi-
tions change, and calibrate their enforcement to encourage the
banks to be more prudent in their future lending. Hard and fast
legal restrictions written into a statute ill serve the requirements of
an intrinsically fluid situation."
The Conference Committee reached a compromise in drafting
the International Lending Supervision Act. Thus, the only
mandatory provision in the Act is section 906(a)(1) which provides
that "no banking institution shall charge, in connection with the
restructuring of an international loan, any fee exceeding the ad-
ministrative cost of the restructuring unless it amortizes such fee
over the effective life of each such loan."78 This provision reflects
the concern of some of the members of the House of Representa-
tives that the additional charges known as rescheduling fees were
adding to developing countries' debt burden. Section 906(a)(1)
takes away the regulators' discretion in providing for the account-
ing treatment of fees charged in connection with the restructuring
of an international loan. Presumably, the regulators continue to
have a certain amount of discretion in determining what are "ad-
ministrative cost[s] of the restructuring[s]."
The other provisions of the Act do not set mandatory require-
ments for the banks. Each simply directs the appropriate federal
banking agency80 to promulgate regulations to carry out the pro-
The prominence of the Council in implementing the Act, is seen by the Com-
mittee as conducive to greater international regulatory cooperation and
coordination.
House Report, supra note 73, at 28.
77. IMF Managing Director de Larosi~re recently stressed to the Council on Foreign Re-
lations that "there is also a critical role for the commercial banks in the future, as in the
past, in any constructive and meaningful resolution of the debt problems. The banks will
have to continue to provide restructuring and new money on realistic terms to debtor coun-
tries implementing adjustment policies." IMF Survey, Dec. 10, 1984, at 380.
78. ILSA § 906(a)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3905(a)(1).
79. Id.
80. ILSA uses the term "Federal banking agencies" to refer to the FDIC, the Comptroller
of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve System. Id. § 903(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3902(1).
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posals of the Joint Memorandum."' Congress wisely permitted the
regulators the flexibility they needed to manage the developing
problems of the debt crisis. Indeed, the congressional statement of
policy, "to assure that the economic health and stability of the
United States and the other nations of the world shall not be ad-
versely affected or threatened in the future by imprudent lending
practices or inadequate supervision, 82 reflects the multi-faceted
goals of the regulators.
III. REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEND-
ING SUPERVISION ACT OF 1983
In 1983 and early 1984, the regulators issued a series of proposed
and final regulations to implement the five-point program set forth
in the Joint Memorandum and ratified by the International Lend-
ing Supervision Act. The remainder of this Article will analyze the
implementation of the statutory mandate for special reserve re-
quirements and the accounting rules for loan fees. The analysis
will illustrate and develop the thesis that the U.S. response to the
debt crisis, as demonstrated by the banking regulators, is to at-
tempt simultaneously to respond to the congressional desire to re-
strain the banks in their foreign lending while accommodating the
need of the international system for continued inflow of funds to
developing countries to avoid a world-wide domino effect in the
system if one or more major countries become unable to pay their
external bills.
A. Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve Rules
Section 905 of the Act incorporates the regulators' proposal for
the possible imposition of special reserves against loans to certain
debtor countries. Specifically, section 905(a)(1) provides that the
regulators
shall require a banking institution to establish and main-
tain a special reserve whenever, in the judgment of such
appropriate Federal banking agency-
(A) the quality of such banking institution's assets has
been impaired by a protracted inability of public or pri-
81. See id. §§ 904-905, 907-909, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3903-3904, 3906-3908; see also id. § 910(a),
12 U.S.C.A. § 3909(a) (statutory authority for federal agencies to issue regulations).
82. Id. § 902(a)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3901(a)(1).
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vate borrowers in a foreign country to make payments on
their external indebtedness as indicated by such factors,
among others, as-
(i) a failure by such public or private borrowers to
make full interest payments on external
indebtedness;
(ii) a failure to comply with the terms of any re-
structured indebtedness; or
(iii) a failure by the foreign country to comply with
any International Monetary Fund or other suitable
adjustment program; or
(B) no definite prospects exist for the orderly restoration
of debt service.8"
Presumably, under this provision, if a country was continuing to
make the scheduled payments on its bank loans but was also con-
tinuing to borrow new money from the private banks in violation
of an IMF program, the regulators would be authorized to "en-
courage" the banks to stop such new lending in violation of the
IMF program by the imposition of the expensive special reserves
against those loans. Obviously, Congress had not forgotten the
Pertamina episode.
Section 905(a)(2) provides that the special reserves "shall be
charged against current income and shall not be considered as part
of capital and surplus or allowances for possible loan losses for reg-
ulatory, supervisory, or disclosure purposes."'" In one sense this
provision gives the regulators more than they requested. In the
Joint Memorandum, they asked for the power to choose such treat-
ment.8 5 Section 905(a) suggests that Congress accepted the idea
that the special reserves are much more of a goad to the banks
than they are reserves against lending risks.86
On the other hand, Congress was aware of the necessity of not
discouraging the flow of new money to a developing country in the
83. Id. § 905(a)(1), 12 U.S.C.A § 3904(a)(1); see Joint Memorandum, supra note 49, re-
printed in Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 29-30 ("such reserve provisions would not ap-
ply to lending to a country where the terms of any restructuring of debt were being met,
where interest payments were being made and where the borrowing country is complying
with the terms of an IMF-approved stabilization program.").
84. ELSA § 905(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904(a)(2).
85. Joint Memorandum, supra note 49, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 29,
40-42 (Appendix C).
86. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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process of rescheduling its debt. Thus, the House Committee Re-
port notes that
[s]ome Members of the Committee were concerned that
[the similar provision of the House bill] could cause
smaller banks to stop lending to countries which are in
the process of reorganizing their finances and desperately
need credit to prevent having to default. . . . It cannot
be emphasized strongly enough that the language of the
bill regarding reserves in [sic] intended to be used by the
Examination Council and the banking agencies to stabi-
lize international financial conditions and assure orderly
credit markets.8 7
The context of this House Committee Report makes clear that
to "assure orderly credit markets" means not discouraging banks
from making new loans as a part of restructuring agreements. This
flexibility is all the more striking because it came from the House
of Representatives. Historically, the attitude of the House toward
bank lending and the oversight of that lending by the banking reg-
ulators have been less than wholly supportive. The House Commit-
tee Report's vehement rejection of the regulators' suggestion that
legislation was not required evidences this attitude.'8
The regulators' response to section 905 of the Act indicates how
clearly they understand the necessary role of the private banks in
the continued functioning of the international financial system.
The proposed regulations concerning the special reserves were
published by the three agencies in late December 1983.9
Apart from choosing a special name for the reserves, the "Allo-
cated Transfer Risk Reserve" (ATRR), the proposed regulations
did not expand on the congressional language in the Act. The pro-
posed regulations simply repeated the congressional language and
asked for comments. The proposals noted that the federal banking
agencies would jointly determine which "international assets"
87. House Report, supra note 73, at 29.
88. Id. at 26-27. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
89. The Comptroller of the Currency's proposed version is reported at 48 Fed. Reg. 66,597
(1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 20) (proposed Dec. 16, 1983). The Federal Reserve
version is reported at 48 Fed. Reg. 57,140 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 211) (pro-
posed Dec. 22, 1983). The FDIC version is reported at 48 Fed. Reg. 56,764 (1983) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 351) (proposed Dec. 16, 1983). The proposed regulations and the
introductions thereto are identical, and therefore future references will be to the Federal
Reserve's proposed regulation.
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would be subject to the reserve and the amount and timing of the
reserve for specified assets.e0 In this way, the regulators were en-
suring that there would be no "competition of laxness" among the
agencies.
Finally, the proposed regulations contained a replenishment pro-
vision. Rather than having to establish an ATRR against assets
found to be impaired by the transfer risk problems as described in
the statute, banking institutions would have the option to write
down all or part of the assets subject to the special reserves against
the reserve for loan losses ordinarily kept by banks. Consequently,
the amount of ATRR balances that would otherwise be required
would be reduced. In the event the option were exercised, however,
the regulators proposed a requirement that the reserves be replen-
ished out of current earnings by the amount that such reserves
were written down.91 In other words, the provisions for special
reserves would in no case allow a bank to avoid a reduction to its
current earnings if a particular country's borrowings were found to
fall into a special reserve category.
The proposals asked for comments not only as to the percentage
norms for the reserve and the factors to be used in determining the
amount of reserves, but also "the appropriate treatment of new
loans where comparable outstanding loans are subject to reserves
required by this regulation." '92 The Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve received thirty-nine responses. 3 Virtually all the
banks recognized the inevitability of special reserve rules, and
their comments focused on a rational implementation that would
not be so burdensome to the banks. The main criticisms related to
the replenishment provision. Commenters argued that if a bank
chose to write down an asset instead of establishing an ATRR, the
loan loss reserve account should be replenished only to the extent
90. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,142 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211A4). Generally, the assets
would be those subject to transfer risk such that the quality of the assets was impaired by a
country's protracted inability to pay or a lack of definite prospects for restoration of debt
service. The Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve (ATRR) thus established would initially be
10% of the principal amount of those specified international assets (or a greater or lesser
percentage as determined by the banking agencies.) Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 211.43(b)).
91. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.46).
92. Id. at 57,141.
93. There were 17 comments from U.S. banks and bank holding companies, 5 from trade
associations, 8 from foreign banks, 8 from Federal Reserve banks, and 1 from New York's
Banking Department. The Comptroller of the Currency received 17 comment letters, largely
from national banks, while the FDIC received 6 comments. 49 Fed. Reg. 5588 (1984).
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necessary to restore it to a level adequate to reflect the remaining
risks in the loan portfolio." For example, several commenters
noted that the proposed rule could put responsible banks that pre-
viously had charged weak loans against earnings at a competitive
disadvantage vis-a-vis less responsible banks that made no provi-
sion for weak loans. 5 This would, in turn, discourage conservative
practices. The commenters suggested that the size of the general
reserve for loan losses has traditionally been a discretionary matter
for bankers and their accountants. Therefore, if the banks have
prudently written off bad loans promptly, they should not have to
replenish the general loan loss reserve account by the amount of an
ATRR asset when they believe that the loan loss account is suffi-
cient to cover their remaining assets.96
The other major point made in the comments concerned the
treatment of additional loans to borrowers in a country already on
the special reserves list. The banks stressed that any provision re-
quiring the application of the ATRR to new loans would be
counterproductive. The banks noted that this would mean that the
cost of new money going to countries in severe difficulty would be
even greater and the attempts to reschedule more difficult because
of the requirement of reserves against the additional loans.9 7 The
banks stressed that requiring such reserves would not encourage
banks to participate in new lending to developing countries.
The regulators' response to the comments was accommodation
and the final regulation follows the good sense of the comments.9 8
The major alteration of the proposed regulation resulted from the
banks' criticism of the replenishment provision. The final regula-
tion does not require replenishment of the allowance for possible
loan losses by the amount of an ATRR asset written down unless
such replenishment is "necessary to restore it to a level which ade-
quately provides for the estimated losses inherent in the banking
94. Id. at 5589.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Letter from Douglas E. Ebert, Executive Vice President, Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Company, to William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Jan. 11, 1984) (copy on file at the Offices of the Virginia Journal of International
Law).
98. The final regulation for all three agencies was issued February 9, 1984. See Allocated
Transfer Risk Reserve, 49 Fed. Reg. 5590-91 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.1, 20.2,
20.6-20.8); id. at 5591-93 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.41-211.43); id. at 5593 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 351.1).
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institution's loan portfolio."99 The same provision counts write-
downs in prior periods as well as reductions in principal against
the allowance for possible loan losses as acceptable alternatives for
an ATRR.
Moreover, the agencies' preamble to the final regulations states
that "an ATRR normally would not be required initially for net
new lending when the additional loans are made in countries im-
plementing economic adjustment programs, such as programs ap-
proved by the International Monetary Fund, designed to correct
the countries' economic difficulties in an orderly manner."100 The
reasoning, in accord with that of the comments, was that new loans
would improve the quality of outstanding credit and thus "be con-
sistent with" the Act's objective of "improved supervision of inter-
national lending."10' 1 In short, the final regulations suggest that the
regulators were willing to accede to virtually all of the banks' sug-
gestions, especially those indicating the need for continued bank
involvement in the restructuring process.
Finally, and most interestingly, the regulations turned out to be
completely in terrorem, because the reserve provisions only come
into effect to the extent that the ICERC determines that assets in
particular countries should be subject to an ATRR. 02 As of the
spring of 1984, the regulators had announced only five countries
for which the special reserves are to be created and charged against
income if the loans to those countries have not already been writ-
ten off against the general loan loss allowance. These countries,
Zaire (seventy-five percent reserves), Sudan (fifty percent
reserves), Poland (fifteen percent reserves), Nicaragua (fifteen per-
cent reserves), and Bolivia (ten percent reserves) 0 3 are those
against whose borrowings the banks in general have already made
provision in their allowance for possible loan losses. Since under
99. Id. at 5591 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 20.8(c)(4)); id. at 5592-93 (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. § 211.43(c)(4)); id. at 5593 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 351.1(c)(4)).
100. Id. at 5588.
101. Id.
102. For the standards used by the regulators to determine whether specific loans require
a special reserve, see id. at 5591 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 20.8(a)(2)); id. at 5592 (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.43(b)(2)); id. at 5593 (to be codified at 12 CF.R.
§ 351.1(b)(2)(ii)).
103. See 42 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 3 (Jan. 2, 1984). During the summer of 1984,
the ICERC put pressure on banks to be more cautious about making more loans in countries
like Venezuela which was not yet on the ATRR list. Witcher, Possibly Bad News for U.S.
Banks, WalL St. J., Aug. 7, 1984, at 36, col 2.
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the final regulation, write-off against such coverage can substitute
for the creation of an ATRR, it should not be expensive for the
banks to comply with the Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves for
those five countries. Moreover, in light of their concern that lend-
ing to developing countries on the brink be continued in the inter-
est of a resolution to the crisis of developing country debt, it would
not be surprising if the regulators choose not to add other coun-
tries to the list.
The final regulation simultaneously results in appeasing Con-
gress with the special reserves and protecting the public interest in
continued lending to developing countries by not discouraging
banks with ATRR's. Thus, in the area of special reserves, the regu-
lators seem to be trying both to respect the domestic political pro-
cess and appear as dutiful regulators and to relieve the banks of
the effects of a very burdensome provision. Of course, the risk they
run is another round of congressional blame if the accommodation
does not work and the reschedulings do not successfully avoid de-
faults on loans that are not offset with sufficient reserves.
B. Fee Accounting Rules
Section 906(a)(1) of the International Lending Supervision Act
seeks to "avoid excessive debt service burdens on debtor coun-
tries"10  by forbidding banks from charging "any fee exceeding the
administrative cost of the restructuring" unless the fee is amor-
tized over the life of the restructured loan.10 5 This section reflects
Congress' belief that additional fees paid to banks upon an exten-
sion to existing international loans represent an added interest
charge to compensate for the additional credit risks incurred with
the rescheduled principal, and thus such fees should be amortized
over the effective life of the loan.108
In contrast, section 906(b)(1) instructs the federal banking agen-
cies to "promulgate regulations for accounting for agency, commit-
ment, management and other fees charged by a banking institution
in connection with an international loan. '10 7 Section 906(b)(2) ex-
plains that the purpose of the regulations is "to assure that the
appropriate portion of such fees is accrued in income over the ef-
104. ILSA § 906(a)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3905(a)(1).
105. Id.
106. See Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 76-77.
107. ILSA § 906(b)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3905(b)(1).
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fective life of each such loan."' 08 The legislative history of the Act
clearly indicates that section 906(b) was intended to curtail the
front-end loading of various fees charged in connection with inter-
national syndicated loans, a practice that the regulators viewed as
an artificial incentive for banks to make international loans. 09
The concern of Congress and the regulators was well founded.
Under generally accepted accounting principles, if payments by a
borrower are labeled "fee for services," the full payment can be
taken into income at the time the loan agreement is signed. If,
however, the fee is considered simply a way of increasing yield on
the loan, then it is "interest" and should be accounted for over the
life of the loan. To the extent that banks can claim fees as service-
related rather than yield-related, they can gain short-term boosts
in earnings.
In addition to front-end fees, there are other opportunities in
international syndicated lending to report fees as current earnings.
For reasons about which legal anthropologists can only speculate,
foreign sovereign lending syndicates of multinational commercial
banks are put together in a fashion that resembles investment
banking syndicates. °0 Thus, for example, the lead bank in such
sovereign lending syndicates refers to its undertaking to round up
the group of lenders as "underwriting.""' Since the lending func-
tion is referred to as "underwriting," then function follows form;
the banking syndicates charge the borrowers "fees," and some
108. Id. § 906(b)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3905(b)(2).
109. The current practice of taking front end fees into income in the quarter or year
in which they are charged, rather than spread over the life of the loan is an
incentive to promote international loans in order to boost earnings. Banks
should be making loans based on the creditworthiness of the borrower not on
short-term profitability considerations. The establishment of an accepted ac-
counting treatment for front end fees will contribute to the future stability of
the international financial system by eliminating artificial incentives to make in-
ternational loans.
House Report, supra note 73, at 31.
110. In the United States, investment banking, the process by which funds are raised for
economic enterprises by investment banks that publicly distribute securities of these enter-
prises, has been separated from the business of commercial banking, the raising of funds by
deposit-taking and the reselling of the funds by lending. See 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982). Invest-
ment bankers traditionally consider their "underwriting" a "service" for the client
corporation.
111. This, of course, is a misuse of the term "underwriter." A true "underwriter" bears
the risk of securities it has purchased but cannot resell. See Black's Law Dictionary 1369
(5th ed. 1979). No court would ever force a single lead bank or group thereof to lend the full
amount of a promised loan if the promised participants could not be found.
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banks thereby account for those payments as fees for services in-
cludable immediately in income.
Since large domestic borrowers are not in the habit of paying
such a variety of fees to their commercial bankers, the practice of
receiving and counting as immediate income these fees on interna-
tional sovereign loans tends to make such activity unusually at-
tractive to bankers concerned with maintaining or increasing cur-
rent earnings. It is this practice that the regulators and Congress
thought might be giving an "artificial incentive" to international
lending. Thus, at the time of promulgation of the final ATRR rule
in February 1984, the banking regulators also issued proposed reg-
ulations on accounting for international loan fees, in accordance
with Congress' mandate in section 906(b). 112
The proposed regulations sought to cut through the various se-
mantic distinctions among the fees and to create a unified func-
tional accounting approach for the commercial banks making for-
eign loans. Thus the proposed regulations made no distinction
between fees received in connection with a restructuring and vari-
ous other fees received in connection with international lending.113
The proposed regulations simply provided that all fees received in
connection with international loans other than loan commitment
fees should be recognized over the loan period to the extent they
exceed the administrative costs of the international loan. "Loan
commitment fees were to be deferred and amortized over the term
of the combined commitment and loan period. 11 4 In short, the
practice of "front-end loading" was made much less attractive. The
preamble of the proposed regulation indicated that the reasoning
behind the regulators' sweeping proposal was that "accounting
practices should not result in artificial incentives for banking insti-
tutions to make international loans premised on the immediate
recognition of all fee income. 1 1 5
The regulators had proposed strict accounting rules in the Joint
112. The Comptroller of the Currency's proposed version is reported at 49 Fed. Reg. 5597,
(1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 20) (proposed Feb. 8, 1984). The Federal Reserve's
proposed version is reported at 49 Fed. Reg. 5597-98 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
211) (proposed Feb. 8, 1984). The FDIC's proposed version is reported at 49 Fed. Reg. 5598
(1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 351) (proposed Feb. 6, 1984). The proposed regula-
tions and the introductions thereto are identical, and therefore future references will be to
the Federal Reserve's proposed regulations.
113. Id. at 5595.
114. Id. at 5598 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.45(b)(2)).
115. Id. at 5595.
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Memorandum; " 6 Congress had concurred;111 and the proposed reg-
ulations seemed unusually firm. Nevertheless, perhaps doubtful of
the impact of the proposed rules on the multinational banks, the
regulators asked for industry comment on such subjects as the lack
of differentiation between fees collected for restructured loans and
those related to other international loans; the proposed deferral
and amortization of loan commitment fees; the accounting meth-
ods for costs and fee income associated with merchant banking ac-
tivities; and the accounting treatment in the proposed regulations
that was inconsistent with domestic loan accounting practices.118
The reaction from the international banks was an immediate
protest. The regulators received 67 comments. "1 9 The commenters
argued that while Congress had mandated a stop to the front-end
loading of fees received in connection with restructurings, 120 it had
not mandated any particular accounting treatment for fees re-
ceived in connection with international loans. 21 The banks com-
menting, therefore, asked for a narrow definition of "restructuring"
in order that Congress' mandate would only apply to loans that
were rescheduled by debtor countries because of lack of foreign ex-
change to pay their external debt and not to loans that were refi-
nanced for other reasons.
1 22
Above all, the commenters wanted to ensure that they could
continue to take into income as "service income" the management
fees on the syndicated international loans. 2 3 A reading of the
London-based magazine "Euromoney" over the years gives a pic-
ture of how fierce the competition is among the banks in the
Eurocurrency markets to be lead bank on the sovereign loans be-
cause the lead bank receives the management fee for arranging the
loan.2 4 In effect, the banks saw the profitability of these fees being
reduced by the new proposed regulations. The comment letters
116. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
118. 49 Fed. Reg. 5596 (1984).
119. The Federal Reserve and the Comptroller received 30 letters from banks and bank
holding companies, 10 from trade associations or firms, 7 from accounting firms or groups,
and 6 from Federal Reserve banks. The FDIC received 14 letters, all duplicates of comments
received by the other two agencies. Id. at 12,193.
120. See ILSA § 906(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3905(a).
121. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,193 (1984). See ILSA § 906(b), 12 U.S.CA § 3905(b).
122. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,194 (1984).
123. Id. at 12,194-95.
124. See, e.g., Euromoney, Aug. 1982, at 47-49; ; Nov. 1981, at 139-41; Oct. 1981, at 264-
67.
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raised elaborate arguments as to why the management fees were
fees for services... and the extent to which the new regulation
would make competition with the multinational banks' competi-
tors, the merchant banks, much more difficult. 126 In response to
the comments received, the agency addressed the issue of syndica-
tion fees as follows:
[t]here can be little dispute that banking institutions
that are "lead" or "managing" banks provide services, as
described by the commenters, in connection with interna-
tional loan syndications. These banking institutions also
frequently participate in the loan, and often their share
in the loan is among the largest of all participants. In
such circumstances, the activities of the institution in
syndicating the loan are, to at least some extent, integral
to the lending of funds.M
27
The preamble cautions, however, that "what additional portion of
the syndication fees is intended to compensate a managing bank
for making the loan, as compared with arranging loans for others,
is not easily determined using any generalized standard and may
vary from case to case.'
u2 8
Apparently, the regulators realized that in this area, they were
confronting a dilemma. In theory, the banking agencies are regu-
lating commercial banks that are forbidden by the Glass-Steagall
Act to act like merchant banks. 129 On the other hand, the Glass-
Steagall Act does not apply to foreign merchant banks that do no
underwriting within the United States, nor does it prevent U.S.
banks from participating in such activity abroad. In short, there
are major U.S. multinational banks abroad that do compete with
merchant banks and have mixed commercial and merchant bank-
ing functions, just like foreign institutions. There really is no rea-
son why such institutions should not be allowed to receive fees for
arranging loans by others. The problem, of course, is that in the
case of foreign syndicate lending, the lead bank also acts as a lend-
ing bank, and could be viewed as merely doing what it would do in
125. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,194 (1984).
126. Id. at 12,195.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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a very large domestic loan, that is, participating out the portion of
the loan too large for its own capital base. In this case, its func-
tions look much more like "banking" than "underwriting."
In the final regulation the regulators appeared to accept the
banks' arguments concerning the provision of services and ac-
counting for the lead or managing bank fees. 30 The preamble to
the final regulation, however, makes clear that there is some limi-
tation on the ability of the lead bank to take the fee into income:
In order to assure that, in practice, the appropriate por-
tion of the fee is amortized, the final regulations allow
the banking institution to take the fee into income when
the loan is closed only to the extent the institution can
identify and document the services for which the speci-
fied fee was received. Documentation for this purpose
shall include the loan agreement, signed by all of the par-
ties to the loan, which identifies the services provided
and the total fee received by the institution for provision
of such syndication or management services. . . If the
portion of fees received representing compensation for
such services cannot be so identified and documented,
then the fee will be presumed to be an adjustment to
yield [i.e., additional interest] and must be amortized
over the life of the loan.13'
The requirement that the total fee be included in the loan agree-
ment may cause problems in loan syndications in which the exact
amount of the management fee has been negotiated between the
debtor country and the managing or lead banks and the other bank
participants are not aware of the full amount of the fee. If the
other banks in the syndicate become aware of the amount of the
management fee, they might ask why the sovereign could not af-
ford to pay a higher interest rate if it could afford such a fee.
Indeed, it has become a custom in syndicated loans to share
some of the management fee with other participating banks to in-
duce them to participate.132 This portion of the fee the regulators
have insisted both in the proposed regulation and in the final regu-
130. See Accounting for International Loans Fees, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,196 (1984) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.7, 20.9); id. at 12,197-98 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.42,
211.45); id. at 12,198-99 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 351.2).
131. Id. at 12,195.
132. Id. at 12,194.
1985]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
lation represents an adjustment to yield and must be amortized. It
seems clear from the preamble that in order to take the portion of
the management fee not shared with the other banks into income
immediately, the lead bank must insert the amount of the manage-
ment fee into the loan agreement.133 This will enable the partici-
pating banks to demand a greater portion of the management fee
as the price of their participation. To the extent that they do so,
the accounting treatment of that portion of the fee will change for
all participating banks, including the lead bank.
It will be very interesting to see how the final regulations for
accounting change the drafting work of the British and U.S. law-
yers that specialize in the documentation of the syndicated loan
agreements. In this instance, the regulators, while appearing to ac-
commodate the multinational banks, may have in fact found a way
of tracking Congress' purpose and reducing the amount of fees for
sovereign lending that can be front-ended, thus reducing the at-
tractiveness of foreign sovereign loans vis-&-vis domestic lending.
IV. CONCLUSION
It can only be concluded that the response of the U.S. Congress
to the international debt "crisis" in the form of the International
Lending Supervision Act has not changed the regulation of U.S.
commercial banks' international lending to any significant degree.
The regulators have been given statutory authority to use small
tools to discipline lending to countries that are failing to adhere to
their IMF austerity programs and to discourage a preference for
international lending for financial statement purposes. Neither of
these tools will have any significant effect on the volume of inter-
national lending by U.S. banks.134 The decision-making power over
133. Id. at 12,195.
134. This is not to say that the Act has not given the regulators a powerful new weapon in
their fight for bank prudence. The contrary is true, but the weapon is directed specifically to
control of sovereign lending as such.
Once again, space limitations preclude even minimal discussion of the relation of bank
capital adequacy to issues of safety and soundness, but in the hearings, Congress became
aware of the very low levels to which bank, particularly major money market bank, capital
had fallen vis-a-vis total assets. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
Congress also became aware that the federal regulators did not have specific legislative
authority to force the banks to raise capital levels, although adequate capitalization is al-
ways a factor in regulatory approvals of acquisitions under the Bank Holding Company Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982). Thus, section 908 of the Act, entitled "Capital Adequacy,"
directs the regulators to "cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capi-
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the prudent quantity and quality of international loans ends up
where it started, with the management and boards of directors of
the multinational banks.135
This form of response is hardly surprising for two reasons. The
first is the continuing need for a flow of funds into the debtor
countries. As has been continually stressed in this Article, even the
House of Representatives recognized, for the moment, the neces-
sity of rolling over the loans, and of allowing the rescheduling pro-
cess to continue with the addition of new money to keep the inter-
est payments on the old loans current, or at least current enough
tal by establishing minimum levels of capital for such banking institutions" and specifically
grants to the regulators "the authority to establish such minimum level of capital for a
banking institution as [the regulator], in its discretion, deems to be necessary or appropriate
in light of the particular circumstances of the banking institution." ILSA § 908(a)(1)-(2), 12
U.S.C.A. § 3907(a)(1)-(2). The section also provides that the failure of a banking institution
to maintain the minimum level of capital prescribed may be deemed by the regulator, "in its
discretion,. . . an unsafe and unsound practice," thus permitting regulatory action as pre-
scribed by the Act. Id. § 908(b)(1), 12 U.S.C.. § 3907(b)(1). The section also specifically
authorizes the imposition on banks "of a plan acceptable to the [regulator] describing the
means and timing by which the banking institution shall achieve its required capital leveL"
Id. § 908(b)(2)(B)(i), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3907(b)(2)(B)(i).
Section 908 of the Act is the legislative authority behind the recent imposition of formal
agreements to bolster capital on the boards of directors of BankAmerica and Continental
Illinois. See Profit Rises 38.9% at Big Coast Bank, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1985, at D1, col 6.
This article noted that
because of BankAmerica's high level of... problem loans, the Comptroller of
the Currency last year required the company's directors to sign legally binding
pledges that they would . . . increase the primary capital of the Bank of
America, the holding company's principal subsidiary, to 5.5 percent of total as-
sets by the end of 1984.
Id. See also "Citicorp Widens Lead Over BankAmerica," N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1985, at D1,
col. 4.
135. British scholar, Richard S. Dale, strongly criticized the ICERC supervisory mecha-
nism and the reluctance of the regulators to allocate credit. Stressing the need for added
safeguards against bank failures, Dale noted that "at the very least banks should be pre-
vented from getting into a situation where they can be brought down by a single country's
default." International Financial Markets Hearings 1983, supra note 10, at 388 (statement of
Richard S. Dale, Brookings Inst.). To this end he recommended the imposition of a ceiling
on foreign sovereign lending such as 25% of capital. Id. However, it was this kind of rigid
regulation that was not adopted.
Instead, the provisions of the Act directed specifically at international lending are keyed
into the new capital adequacy section, section 908. See supra note 134. Thus section 905(b)
directs the regulators to
analyze the results of foreign loan rescheduling negotiations, assess the loan loss
risk reflected in rescheduling agreements, and, using the powers set forth in sec-
tion 3907 of this title (regarding capital adequacy), ensure that the capital and
reserve positions of United States banks are adequate to accommodate potential
losses on their foreign loans.
ILSA § 905(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904(b).
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to prevent a mandatory recognition of default,136 and a conceivable
international finadncial breakdown.
1 3 7
The second reason is the international competition for banking
services. This reason has not been stressed, nor was it articulated
in the public debate on the Supervision Act, but it may have been
a cause of the apparent but less than significant U.S. legislative
and regulatory "response." This Article has noted that as long as
states themselves are unwilling to undertake the necessary job of
balance of payments financing, either individually or collectively
through international agencies, the need will be filled at a price by
private banking institutions.1 38 This has been the international
monetary history of the 1970's and 1980's.
These private international intermediaries are hardly all U.S.
owned and regulated. The multinational banks in syndicated sov-
ereign lending are British, German, Swiss and Japanese, with con-
siderable participation by other European Economic Community
or Canadian based banks as well. No discussion of world markets
for steel or automobiles proceeds without recognition of the na-
tional origin of the economic actors and the consequent effects of
their ability to compete in world markets. The same, in fact, is true
for consideration of the regulatory structure of the international
lending market: the United States cannot itself regulate interna-
tional lending without the acknowledgement and examination of
government-imposed bank regulations in other lender nations. U.S.
banks at present are more regulated in their international activi-
136. This Article has been unable, given space limitations, to delve into the accounting
and disclosure questions involved in international lending. The rules are set by a combina-
tion of generally accepted accounting principles, the banking regulators' call report require-
ments, and the SEC financial disclosure requirements for bank holding companies. See gen-
erally Coombe & Laic, Problem Loans, Foreign Outstandings, and Other Developments in
Bank Disclosure, 40 Bus. Law. 485 (1985). The total effect, however, is to force banks to
take any interest income they have accrued (once that interest is more than ninety days in
default) out of reported income and thus reduce reported earnings. Until banks in the Ar-
gentine rescheduling negotiations stopped the game by publicly announcing the actual effect
on income, fear of such announced reductions in income was a card in the hands of the
debtors. At some point, however, if debts due are never rescheduled, they must be written
off as "bad" and then the banks could be insolvent from an accounting point of view. To
Mr. Dale's credit, his proposal for an absolute ceiling on lending insisted that "there would,
of course, have to be extended transitional arrangements, although the most heavily exposed
banks might reasonably be required to increase their capital in order to expedite adjustment
to the new regime." International Financial Markets Hearings 1983, supra note 10, at 388
(statement of Richard S. Dale, Brookings Inst.).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
138. See supra note 77.
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ties than the banks of any other nation. 139 To restrict further their
discretionary lending (or to raise the costs of such lending by addi-
tional reserves) will only inhibit, at considerable cost to the U.S.
balance of payments deficit, their capacity to compete with-or
participate with-the other multinational banks in global lend-
ing.140 Significant regulation of international lending by private in-
stitutions will have to be achieved on an international basis, either
through international coordination or harmonization of regulation
or through what may be an impossible dream, a supranational reg-
ulator. 41 The International Lending Supervision Act indicates that
Congress was well aware of this reality: among other reports re-
quired, the Act directs the Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System to "review the laws, regulations, and
examination and supervisory procedures and practices, governing
international banking in each of the Group of Ten Nations and
Switzerland with particular attention to such matters bearing on
capital requirements, lending limits, reserves, disclosure, examiner
access, and lender of last resort resources..."I'll
In this author's opinion, it is this pointing to international action
with respect to the international debt "crisis" and the role of bank-
ing supervision therein that is the effective and appropriate U.S.
response.
139. See International Financial Markets Hearings 1983, supra note 10, at 391-92 (state-
ment of Richard S. Dale, Brookings Inst.). "In general, foreign supervision of banks' interna-
tional lending is more cursory than in the U.S. On the other hand, given the advisory nature
of the U.S. supervisory system, there is little reason to suppose that US. banks' lending
practices differ significantly from those of foreign banks." Id. at 392 (statement of Richard
S. Dale, Brookings Inst.).
140. See generally Lichtenstein, supra note 20. The extent to which Congress was aware
of the international competitive position of U.S. banks is indicated by the last provision of
the capital adequacy section of the Act, discussed supra note 134. Section 908 directs the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve to "encourage governments, central banks, and regulatory
authorities of other major banking countries to work toward maintaining and, where appro-
priate, strengthening the capital bases of banking institutions involved in international
lending." ILSA § 908(b)(3)(C), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3907(b)(3)(C).
141. For this author, it is the deference shown to the supervising function of the IMF in
its conditionality-ie., to the IMF restrictions on sovereign external borrowing in IMF ad-
justment programs-in the provisions on the Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves that makes
the provisions so interesting.
142. ILSA § 913(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3912(1).
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